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LISA L -S CHENG AND C.-T JAMES H U A N G
TWO TYPES OF DONKEY SENTENCES*
Mandarin Chinese exhibits two paradigms of conditionals with indefinite wA-words
that have the semantics of donkey sentences, represented by 'bare conditionals' on
the one band and ruguo- and Aw-conditionals on the other The bare conditionals
require multiple occurrences of wA-words, disallowmg the use of overt or covert
anaphonc elements in the consequent clause, whereas the ruguo- and dou-condi-
tionals present a completely opposite pattern We argue that the bare conditionals
are cases of unselective bmdmg par excellence (Heim 1982, Kamp 1981) while the
ruguo- and ifow-conditionals are most naturally accounted for with the traditional E-
type pronoun strategy of Evans (1980). We thus argue partly for a return to the
Ε-type strategy (along with Heim 1990) but maintam the need for unselective bmdmg
m UG (cf. Kratzer 1989, Chierchia 1992) It is further shown that these two para-
digms do not differ with respect to the Proportion problem and the distnbution of
Symmetrie and asymmetnc readings of Kadmon (1987), though they differ with respect
to V and 3 readings (discussed in Chierchia 1992) in a non-tnvial way that provides
further Support for the proposed approach. Finally, evidence is given that the bare
conditionals should be kept apart from correlative constructions in languages like Hindi,
and treated differently from the latter
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N
The treatment of donkey sentences has been the center of much debate since
the topic was introduced to linguists in the early '80s. Central to this
debate is the question of the Status of the pronouns and the indefinite NPs
with which they are related in « sentence like (1):
(1) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
Take the pronoun it, for example. It has an indefinite NP äs its "antecedent,"
* Vanous versions of this paper were presented at NACCL 4 at the Umversity of Delaware,
NELS 24 at UMass Amheist, the Conference on the Robustness of the Language Faculty at
the Umversity of Utrecht, and at colloquia at UCLA, Ohio State Umversity, and the Umversity
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which, on the traditional Russellian analysis, is an existential quantifier.
However, it is not a true bound variable because äs an existential quanti-
fier the indefinite NP in the antecedent clause clearly does not have scope
over it and hence cannot bind it. Two prominent Solutions to this paradox
have been proposed. Evans (1980) adopted the Russellian view of the
indefinite äs a quantifier and denied the bound-variable Status of the
pronoun. Heim (1982) and Kamp (1981), on the other hand, developed an
alternative theory, within the framework of their Discourse Representation
Theory (DRT), which maintains the bound-variable Status of the pronoun,
but denies the Status of the indefinite äs an existential quantifier. According
to Evans (1980), the pronouns he and it in (1) belong to a distinct category,
called Ε-type pronouns, whose Status is more on a par with definite descrip-
tions than true variables (see also Cooper 1979 and Parsons 1978 for
earlier suggestions to the same effect). The role played by the E-type
pronouns is that of referring "to the object(s), if any, which verify the
antecedent quantifier-containing clause" (p. 340). According to this analysis,
a sentence such äs (2a) can be interpreted äs (2b):
(2) a. If a man enters the room, he will trip the switch.
b. If a man enters the room, the man who enters the room will
trip the switch.
Evans uses the sentences in (3a) and (3b) to show a clear contrast between
bound pronouns and Ε-type pronouns:
(3) a. Few congressmen admire only the people they know.
b. Few congressmen admire Kennedy, and they are very junior.
The pronoun they in (3a) is bound by the quantifier phrase/ew congressmen
which c-commands it. In contrast, the pronoun they in (3b) is not bound
by the quantifier phrase since the latter does not c-command the formen
Further, the Interpretation of the sentences clearly shows that the pronoun
they in (3b) is not a bound pronoun. (3b) entails two things: (i) few con-
gressmen admire Kennedy, and (ii) all the congressmen who admire
Kennedy are very junior. However, if the pronoun i s interpreted äs a bound
pronoun, the reading will be "Few congressmen both admire Kennedy and
are very junior." According to this reading, there can be many congressmen
who admire Kennedy, though only a few of them are junior. This is not a
reading available to (3b).
Evans shows that an Ε-type pronoun cannot take a negative quantifier
like no one, nobody äs its antecedent:1
There are some apparent counterexamples to this claim, äs pointed out by the reviewers:
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(4) a. No congressmen admire only the people they know.
b.*No congressmen admire Kennedy, and they are very junior.
(5) a. No donkey likes a farmer to beat it.
b.*If a farmer owns no donkey, he beats it.
*This is a natural consequence of the Ε-type analysis, since the meaning
of an Ε-type pronoun is simply not compatible with having a negative quan-
tificational expression äs an antecedent. As Evans states, Ε-type pronouns
refer to "the objects that verify the antecedent quantifier-containing clause,"
and "the truth of the clause containing them requires that all the relevant
objects satisfy the predicate, . . ." In the case of the quantifier no donkey,
no member of the set {x| donkey (x)} satisfies the antecedent predicate,
so a pronoun (äs a definite description, which presupposes the existence
of at least one member that satisfies the predicate) is inappropriate. For a
similar reason, this analysis explains why an Ε-type pronoun must take
the plural form if the antecedent is a universal quantifier, though this is
not required of a true bound variable:
(6) a. Every donkey fears that its/?their owner will beat it/?them.
b. If a farmer owns every donkey, he will beat them/*it.
Since there is no unique donkey that can alone make the antecedent clause
true in (6b), a Singular pronoun or definite description (which presupposes
the existence of such a singleton set) is inappropriate.
In Evans' analysis, the indefinite antecedent of a donkey pronoun is
treated äs a Standard quantifier, much äs quantifiers like no one, every one
are. The donkey pronoun itself is treated in a unified way regardless of
the quantificational type of its antecedent.
In the DRT analysis of Kamp (1981) and Heim (1982), on the other hand,
an indefinite NP such äs a donkey or a farmer is taken to be something
(i) No one came. They all stayed hörne.
(ii) I saw no first-year Student at the meeting. They went to the party instead.
Compare (iii) with the example in (4b):
(iii) No congressmen admire Kennedy. They all admire Jefferson.
The contrast between (iii) and (4b) in fact shows that the pronoun in (iii) is not an E-type
pronoun. The Ε-type pronoun in (4b) has the denotation 'the congressmen who admire
Kennedy'; this set is null and thus the sentence is ungrammatical. In other words, the pronoun
they takes no one äs its antecedent. Now consider the pronoun in (iii). It does not have the
same denotation. Instead, it denotes 'the congressmen who do NOT admire Kennedy', which
is not a null set. That is, the pronoun they in this case does not take no one äs its antecedent.
Hence, the examples here are not counterexamples to Evans' claim.
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without inherent quantificational force, äs it exhibits quantificational
variability under adverbs of quantification (Lewis 1975). Thus the indefi-
nites in (1) may appear to have the quantificational force of all, most, and
some in the context of always, usually, and sometimes, respectively:
(7) Always, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
=A11 farmers (x) and donkeys (y) are such that if χ owns y,
then χ beats y.
(8) Usually, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
=Most farmers (x) and donkeys (y) are such that if χ owns y,
then x beats y.
(9) Sometimes, if a farmer owns a donkey, he beats it.
=Some farmers (x) and donkeys (y) are such that x owns y,
then x beats y.
According to the DRT analysis, the indefinite is taken not to be a quanti-
fier, but itself a variable bound by an adverb of quantification, from which
it derives its quantificational force. In the absence of an overt adverb of
quantification, Heim assumes that both the indefinites (qua variables) and
the pronouns (also variables) are unselectively bound by an implicit neces-
sity operator associated with conditionals, which expresses conditional
necessity and contributes universal force. The pronouns share the same Index
äs the indefinite NPs and are thus anaphorically related to them:
(10) Necessarily,
 r if a farmer, owns a donkey,, he, beats itr
Given the universal force of the necessity operator, the Interpretation of
the sentence can be represented äs in (11):
(11) Vx Vy ((x is a man & y is a donkey & x owns y) —> x beats
y)
In the Heim-Kamp approach, then, not only the pronouns but also the
indefinites that antecede them are treated äs true bound variables. It is
worthwhile to note that only indefinites and the donkey pronouns that take
indefinite antecedents are treated äs bound variables. Inherent quantifiers
like everyone, no one are still treated äs generalized quantifiers in the
Standard way, and donkey pronouns that are related to them (e.g. everyone)
would presumably still be treated along some variant of an Ε-type analysis.
In other words, there is no unified treatment of the donkey pronoun across
the various quantification types of its antecedents.
There has been considerable research on the issue since the debate was
introduced more than a decade ago. Some important problems facing these
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proposals were discussed by Kadmon (1987, 1990), Pelletier and Schubert
(1989), and Neale (1991). More recently, Heim (1990) herseif showed that
some of the problems posed by an Ε-type analysis of donkey pronouns
are in fact solvable within the same analysis (augmented by the concept
of minimal Situation),2 and that unselective binding does not fare better than
an Ε-type analysis in solving certain problems.3 Heim (1990) then argues,
in effect, for a return to the traditional Ε-type analysis. On the other hand,
there are two proponents of a mixed approach, namely Kratzer (1989) and
Chierchia (1992). Kratzer (1989) shows that the 'proportion problem'
brought about by the Kamp-Heim approach can be solved by the E-type
strategy. However, the Ε-type strategy leads to the umqueness problem.
To solve the problem associated with the Ε-type strategy, Kratzer proposes
a mixed analysis which utilizes the Kamp-Heim approach within the E-
type strategy (see Kratzer 1989 for details). Chierchia (1992) develops a
dynamic binding approach, which also has the property of mixing a Kamp-
Heim approach and the Ε-type pronoun strategy.
In this paper, we investigate conditional sentences with donkey anaphora
in Mandarin Chinese and show that two distinct types of conditional donkey
sentences must be recognized. We argue that the first type of donkey
sentence (the bare conditionals) is a case of unselective binding par
excellence, whereas the other type (the ruguo- and üfow-conditionals) is
best analyzed in terms of an Ε-type analysis - äs the two types exhibits
2
 Although the property of quantificational vanabihty under adverbs of quantification has
often been taken to be the mam argument for unselective binding (Nishigauchi 1990, Diesmg
1992, etc ), the real argument, äs Heim (1990) points out, lies in the fact that an Ε-type analysis
of a donkey pronoun carnes with it a umqueness presupposition, given Russell's analysis
of defimte descnptions äs entailing both existence and umqueness The problem occurs
with sentences hke (i)
(i) If a man is in Athens, he is not in Rhodes
The Ε-type analysis of he entails that for the sentence to be false, there has to be a umque
man in Athens who is also in Rhodes But under this Interpretation the sentence will always
be true (or without a truth value) smce there is no umque man m Athens This Interpreta-
tion is clearly wrong, äs Speakers have no problem identifymg the truth conditions of the
sentence it is false if any man is ever found to be both in Athens and Rhodes and true
otherwise.
Heim (1990) shows that the problem of umqueness presupposition can be overcome by
the assumption that there is quantification over minimal events (situations) m the matnx clause,
in addition to existential quantification, within the Ε-type analysis, in the embedded antecedent
clause. Thus, (i) is mterpreted äs "For every minimal Situation where exactly one man is m
Athens, there cannot be another minimal Situation where the umque man in Athens is also
in Rhodes "
3
 For example, both approaches face the 'proportion problem', discussed below in section
5
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properties that respectively match the predictions made by these two
approaches in great detail. The evidence presented here sheds light on the
current debate regarding donkey anaphora. Our conclusion is that both
unselective binding and Ε-type strategies are justified for natural language
(and hence also both the notion of an indefinite äs a variable and the
notion of it äs a generalized quantifier), but perhaps not for the types of
constructions that have been studied in English. We concur with Heim
(1990) that an Ε-type analysis would be appropriate (with certain aug-
mentations äs has been suggested) for the type of conditional donkey
sentences that have been considered in English, but argue that there is
also reason to resurrect the analysis of unselective binding she proposed
in Heim (1982). In this respect our conclusion concurs with that of Kratzer
(1989) and Chierchia (1992) in spirit, though it should be clear later that
our approach is not strictly 'mixed', particularly when the first type of
donkey sentences are considered. In line with recent works, we show that
the unselective binding strategy does not differ from the Ε-type strategy
with respect to the proportion problem and the distribution of 'Symmetrie'
and 'asymmetric' readings (Kadmon 1987, 1990, inter alia) äs it shows
up in both kinds of donkey sentences in Chinese. Furthermore, the distri-
bution of the V vs. 3 reading (äs discussed in Chierchia 1992) clearly
distinguishes the bare conditionals from the rwgwo-conditionals. Finally,
we briefly consider a tempting alternative to assimilate the bare conditionals
to correlative constructions in languages like Hindi, but show that the
assimilation is undesirable on the level of syntactic analysis, äs they belong
to very different species.
2. DONKEY SENTENCES IN CHINESE
In Mandarin Chinese, conditional sentences with the appearance of donkey
sentences may involve a w/z-word in the antecedent clause and something
anaphoric to it in the consequent clause. Mandarin exhibits three such
types on the surface: bare conditionals, ifow-conditionals, and ruguo-con-
ditionals. These three types fall into two descriptive paradigms: the bare
conditionals on the one hand, and the dou- and rwgi/oconditionals on the
other. As we shall see, these two paradigms exhibit complementary prop-
erties, in that donkey anaphora in the former can only take the form of a
w/z-word in the consequent clause, disallowing all other forms, whereas
the latter excludes just w/z-words from serving äs donkey pronouns, per-
mitting all other anaphoric forms.
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2.1. Bare Conditionals
'Bare Conditionals' are conditionals which do not have an overt leading
element such äs ruguo 'if' in the antecedent clause or an overt quantifier
such äs dou 'all' in the consequent clause.4 In this type of conditionals,
the word jiu 'then' is optionally present in the consequent clause, äs we
can see in (12).
(12) a. shei xian lai, shei xian chi
who first come, who first eat
'If X comes first, X eats first.'
b. shei xian lai, shei jiu xian chi
who first come, who then first eat
'If X comes first, then X eats first.'
We see in (12) that the presence or absence of jiu 'then' does not entail
any difference in Interpretation. There are two w/z-words in the sentence,
one in the antecedent clause, the other in the consequent clause. As indi-
cated in (13), the w/z-word in the consequent clause cannot be replaced
by an overt pronoun (13a), a null pronoun (13b), or a definite NP (13c).5
Furthermore, there must be an element that can refer back to the w/z-word
in the antecedent clause, or the sentence would be ill-formed, äs in (13d).
The sentences in (14) show the same point äs (13a) through (13d); they
differ only with respect to the location of the w/z-word and the anaphoric
elements under consideration.
(13) Subject-Subject
a.* shei xian lai, ία xian chi
who first come s/he first eat
b.*shei xian lai, [e] xian chi
who first come first eat
c.* shei xian lai, ηα-ge-ren xian chi
who first come that-CL-person first eat
'If X comes first, X eats first.'
4
 The term "bare conditional" used here differs from the terra used in Heim (1982) which
refers to conditional sentences in English without any overt adverb of quantification. Crucially,
'if is present in such conditionals in English. In Mandarin Chinese, the bare conditionals
are bare in that there is no leading element such äs 'if in the antecedent clause.
5
 Chinese is a language which allows null subjects and objects.
128 LISA L.-S. CHENG AND C.-T. JAMES HUANG
d.*shei xian lai, wo bu gaoxing
who first come I not happy
'If X comes first, I will be unhappy.'
(14) Object-Object
a. ni xihuan shei, wo jiu piping shei
you like who I then criticize who
'If you like X, I then criticize X.'
b.*ni xihuan shei, wo jiu piping ta
you like who I then criticize him/her
c.*ni xihuan shei, wo jiu piping [e]
you like who I then criticize
d.*ni xihuan shei, wo jiu piping na-ge-ren
you like who I then criticize that-CL-person
e.*ni xihuan shei, wo bu gaoxing
you like who I not happy
'If you like X, I will be unhappy.'
Sentences (15) and (16) are additional examples showing that even when
the w/z-words do not occur in parallel positions (e.g. subject-subject,
object-object), the pattern observed above still holds.
(15) Subject-Object
a. shei xian jinlai, wo xian da shei
who first enter I first hit who
'If X first enters, I will hit X.'
b.*shei xian jinlai, wo xian da ta
who first enter I first hit him/her
c.* shei xian jinlai, wo xian da [e]
who first enter I first hit
ά.*shei xian jinlai, wo xian da na-ge-ren
who first enters I first hit that-CL-person
(16) Object-Subject
a. ni xihuan shei, shei daomei
you like who who unlucky
'If you like X, X is unlucky.'
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b.*ni xihuan shei, ta daomei
you like who s/he unlucky
c.*ni xihuan shei, [e] daomei
you like who unlucky
d.*ni xihuan shei, na-ge-ren daomei
you like who that-CL-person unlucky
From the above sentences, it is clear that in bare conditionals, the element
which refers back to the w/z-word in the antecedent clause has to be a wh-
word. Moreover, it has to be an identical w/z-word: a different w/z-word
that provides a paraphrase is not acceptable, äs shown in (17).
(17) *ni xihuan shei, wo jiu piping shenme ren
you like who I then criticize what person
'If you like X, I will criticize X.'
We have so far given examples of bare conditionals containing only
one w/z-word in the antecedent clause. Note that there can be more than
one w/z-word, and in these cases the consequent clause has to contain the
same number of w/z-words, referring back to the w/z-words in the antecedent
clause.
(18) shei yan shei, shei jiu xiang shei
who play who who then resemble who
'If X play s the role of Y, then X will resemble Y.'
(19) shei da-puo-le shenme, shei jiu de qu mai shenme
who break-ASP what who then must go buy what
'If X broke Y, then X must buy Y.'
It has been noted by Yu (1965) and Lü (1980) that there are some cases
which seem to show a pronoun/w/z-word alternation (data from Yu 1965):
(20) a. shei yao zhe puo-chang, wo jiu rang gei
who want this broken-factory I then give to
ta/shei
him(her)/who
'Whoever wants this broken factory, Γ11 give it to him/her.'
b. shei bu dui, wo jiu shuo ta/shei bu dui
who not right I then say he(she)/who not right
'Whoever is not right, Γ11 say that he/she is not right.'
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We will discuss these examples in section 3.3. For the moment, we observe
that in those sentences in which a pronoun/w/z-word alternation is possible,
the consequent clause must contain the adverbial element jiu 'then'. In
the absence of this element, the conditional is "completely bare" and no
pronoun/w/z-word alternation is possible:
(21) shei yao zhe puo-chang, wo rang gei shei/*ta.
who want this broken-factory I give to who/him(her)
'Whoever wants this broken factory, I will give it to him/her.'
2.2. Oou-Conditionals and Rugao-Conditionals
DoM-conditionals are characterized by the presence of the quantifier dou
'all' in the consequent clause, whereas ruguo 'if' heads the antecedent clause
in the rwgwo-conditionals.6 These two types of conditionals present an
opposite Situation from the one we have just seen. The element in the
consequent clause which refers back to the w/z-word in the antecedent clause
cannot be a w/z-word; instead, it must be a pronoun (null or overt) or a
definite description.7 Furthermore, there need not be anything in the con-
sequent clause referring back to the w/z-word in the antecedent clause at
all.
(22) a.*ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian shei
you ask who enter I all see who
'Whoever you ask to come in, Γ11 see him/her.'
b. ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian ta
you ask who enter I all see him/her
'Whoever you ask to come in, Γ11 see him/her.'
c. ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian [e]
you ask who enter I all see
d. ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian na-ge-ren
you ask who enter I all see that-CL-person
6
 See section 3.2.2. for a more detailed discussion of Jo«-conditionals äs a species of
"unconditionals" discussed in Zaefferer (1990).
7
 It appears that the occurrence of a null pronoun is less acceptable than an overt pronoun.
We will not discuss the differences in detail because that would lead us to a different topic,
namely, the differences between overt and null pronouns, which have been studied at length
(see e.g., Huang 1984).
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e. ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou bu gaoxing
you ask who enter I all not happy
'Regardless of who you ask to enter, Γ m not happy.'
(23) a.*ruguo ni kandao shei, qing jiao shei lai jian wo
if you see who please teil who come see me
'If you see someone, please ask him/her to come see me.'
b. ruguo ni kandao shei, qing jiao ta lai jian
if you see who please teil him/her come see
wo
me
c. ruguo ni kandao shei, qing jiao [e] lai jian wo
if you see who please teil come see me
d. ruguo ni kandao shei, qing jiao na-ge ren
if you see who please teil that-CL-person
lai jian wo
come see me
'If you see someone, please ask that person to come see me.'
e. ruguo ni kandao shei, qing gankuai gaosu wo
if you see who please quickly teil me
'If you see someone, please teil me quickly.'
In both (22) and (23), the (a) examples with a w/z-word in the consequent
clause are completely ill-formed. The (b-d) examples with an overt pronoun,
a null pronoun, or a definite description that refers back to the w/z-element
are well-formed. The (e) examples with no anaphoric element in the con-
sequent clause at all are also well-formed. As is evident, these conditionals
exhibit striking contrasts with bare conditionals. These contrasts raise a
number of questions:
(24) a. Why can bare conditionals host an identical w/z-word in the
consequent clause but not a pronoun, an empty pronoun, or a
definite description?
b. Why do bare conditionals always need an anaphoric element
in the consequent clause?
c. Why is it the case that the i/ow/rwgwo-conditionals cannot host
a w/z-word in the consequent clause but allow a pronoun or a
definite NP?
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d. Why is it the case that the dou/ruguo-condiüonah do not need
to have an anaphoric element in the consequent clause?
3. ANALYSIS
As an attempt to answer the questions posed in (24), we propose that both
unselective binding and Ε-type pronoun strategies are involved in donkey
anaphora. In particular, the bare conditionals are cases of unselective binding
par excellence, whereas the other two kinds of conditionals have E-type
pronouns.
3.3. Unselective Binding: Bare Conditionals
The properties exhibited in bare conditionals can be summarized äs follows:
(25) Properties of bare conditionals
a. The donkey anaphor must take the form of a w/z-word.
b. The donkey w/z-word must be identical to the w/z-word in the
antecedent clause.
c. There must be an element in the consequent clause referring back
to the w/z-word in the antecedent clause.
To explain this array of properties, we assume, following Cheng (1991,
1995) (cf. Li 1992), that w/z-words in Chinese are polarity items - indefi-
nite NPs which do not have inherent quantificational force but instead
acquire their quantificational force in context, through the external
element(s) that license and/or bind them (see also Heim 1982 and
Nishigauchi 1990). In the case of bare conditionals, which lack an overt
licenser for w/z-words, we assume that these are licensed and bound by
an implicit necessity operator. Along the lines of Heim's (1982) treatment
of indefinites in English, w/z-words are treated not äs quantifiers but äs
variables bound by the necessity operator, which in turn gives rise to the
force of wide-scope universal quantification. Thus, (12) is interpreted äs
in (26).
(26) Vx (x comes first -» χ eats first)
In other words, the w/z-word in the antecedent clause and the one in the
consequent clause are both directly bound by the necessity operator. The
w/z-words share the same index and are thus anaphorically related to each
other. The binding can be truly unselective in that the binder may bind
distinct variables simultaneously. In this case the necessity operator has
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the force of a universal quantifier ranging over ordered pairs. The logical
representation of (18) is äs follows:
(27) Vx Vy ((x plays the role of y) —> (x resembles y))
We assume the necessity operator to be the default binder/licenser of the
w/z-words in bare conditionals without an overt adverb of quantification.
In those cases where an adverb of quantification is present, the adverb is
the binder and licenser, and the quantificational force of the w/z-word
varies from one adverb to another. Thus the following sentences may be
interpreted on a par with quantificational sentences containing determiners
like most, some, and few, respectively.
(28) tongchang, shei yan shei, shei jiu xiang shei
usually who play who who then resemble who
Tor most x, y, if x plays the role of y, then x resembles y.'
(29) you-shihou, shei yan shei, shei jiu xiang shei
sometimes who play who who then resemble who
'For some x, y, if x plays the role of y, then x resembles y.'
(30) (neixie ren) nande shei yan shei, shei jiu
(those people) seldom who play who who then
xiang shei
resemble who
Of those people, it seldom happens that if x plays the role of
y, then x resembles y.'
One question that may arise is why the w/z-words cannot be caught by
existential closure (Heim 1982, Diesing 1992), thereby obtaining existen-
tial force. The answer to this question centers around the properties of
w/z-words in Chinese. They are polarity items and thus need a licenser.
The natural licenser in a bare conditional is the necessity operator.8 Thus,
the necessity operator in a conditional serves äs the polarity licenser and
the binder for the w/z-words. Since the w/z-words already have a binder, there
8
 As Heim (pers. comm.) points out to us, typically in conditionals, only polarity items in
the antecedent clause can be licensed. In the bare conditionals in Mandarin Chinese, it appears
that w/i-words can appear in both antecedent and consequent clauses. This indicates that
the licensing of the tv/z-words in such cases is not something that is particularly related to
the antecedent clause. Note that licenser(s) of particular polarity items may vary even within
a language. Thus, it is not the case that all polarity items can be licensed by the necessity
operator.
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is no reason to invoke existential closure. The prediction is, therefore, that
w/z-words in bare conditionals will not have an existential readmg due to
the unavailability of the existential closure.9
3.3.1. Obhgatory Presence of a Wh-Word in the Consequent Clause
According to our treatment, bare conditionals with w/z-words are interpreted
by universal quantification (in the default cases) involving an unselective
binder that has scope over both the antecedent and consequent clauses.
We are now ready to give an explanation for the properties of bare condi-
tionals observed above. One such property is the obligatory occurrence of
a w/z-word in both clauses: the w/z-words must appear in pairs - if there
is one w/z-word in the antecedent clause, there must be another w/z-word
of the same kind in the consequent clause. And if there are two in the
antecedent clause, two w/z-words must then show up in the consequent
clause. Conversely, if we only find w/z-words in the consequent clause but
not in the antecedent clause, the result is also ungrammatical. Thus, the
question in (24b) can be further specified äs: why is it the case that the
w/z-words must appear in pairs? We suggest that this question can be
answered under the following two assumptions from DRT:10
(31) a. Quantificational elements create tripartite structures of the form
Q [A] [B], where A is the restriction of Q (or its left argument)
and B is the (nuclear) scope of Q (or its right argument) (cf.
Heim 1982).
b. //- and w/zen-clauses form the restriction of a (possibly null)
adverb of quantification (see Kratzer 1986).
More specifically, in a structure of unselective binding, although the un-
selective bmder has inherent quantificational force (unlike the indefinites
it binds), it nevertheless lacks inherent restriction, and hence depends upon
the if- or w/zen-clause to supply its restriction (see von Fintel 1994 for a
discussion of the pragmatic nature of quantifier restriction). Consider now
bare conditionals in Chinese. Even though there is no overt if in these
clauses, the antecedent clause of a bare conditional serves äs the restric-
9
 A reviewer notes that if the w/i-words are treated äs generahzed quantifiers (äs in the
cases m ri/guo-conditionals), there is no need for existential closure However, it should be
noted that the wÄ-words m bare conditionals are not generahzed quantifiers even after they
are licensed (äs polanty items). In particular, the ννΛ-words are interpreted äs havmg universal
force The question of existential closure still anses, though u does not anse m cases ofruguo-
conditionals See also Diesing 1992.
10
 The wordmgs m (31) are from Chierchia 1992
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tion of the necessity operator and the consequent clause äs the nuclear scope
of the operator. In other words, (12a) roughly has the representation in (32):
(32) NECX [x comes first] [x eats first]
Qx restriction nuclear scope
Now consider again the question of why the w/z-words must appear in
pairs. Here we adopt the formulation of the prohibition against vacuous
quantification from Kratzer (1989):
(33) Prohibition Against Vacuous Quantification
(Kratzer 1989, p. 155)
For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q
binds an occurrence of x in both its restrictive clause and its
nuclear scope.
If the w/z-words only appear in the antecedent clause, (33) will be violated.
That is, since the consequence clause is the nuclear scope of the operator,
it must contain a variable for the operator to bind. Also, if the w/z-word(s)
only appear in the consequent clause, (33) again will be violated."
3.1.2. Pronouns, Empty Categories, and Definite Descriptions
Consider now the fact that the second w/z-word in a bare conditional cannot
be replaced by a pronoun, an empty category, or a definite description. In
the case of a pronoun, since it is not interpreted äs having independent
reference, there are two possible interpretations: (i) äs a bound variable
or (ii) äs an Ε-type pronoun. As a bound element, there are two possible
binders: the necessity operator and the w/z-word in the antecedent clause.
If the pronoun in the consequent clause is bound by the necessity operator,
the ban against vacuous quantification is satisfied, but this also amounts
to saying that the pronoun is a resumptive pronoun (i.e. a pronoun directly
bound by an operator). We assume, however, that Chinese is like English
in that it does not have true resumptive pronouns in the sense of Chao
and Seils (1983) and Seils (1984). In other words, in Chinese äs in English,
a pronoun cannot pick up its reference from an operator in A'-position.
Further, we take the view of Chomsky (1976), Higginbotham (1980a,b)
and much subsequent work that when a pronoun is interpreted äs a bound
variable, it is so interpreted in virtue of the fact that it takes a variable
" An alternative way of looking at this is to say that the unselective binder is actually a
polyadic quantifier, äs proposed in Chierchia (1992). Thus, it always binds the sarne n-
tuples of variables in its restriction and in its scope.
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(not an operator) äs its antecedent. In the terminology of Higginbotham
(1985) and Montalbetti (1984), in order for a pronoun to be related refer-
entially to an operator, it must be possible to 'link' the pronoun to a variable
that the operator locally binds.
Let us then consider if a pronoun in the consequent clause of a bare
conditional can take äs its antecedent, or be linked to, the w/z-word (qua
variable) in the antecedent clause:
(34) NEC; [you like whoj [I criticize hirnj
There are two independent reasons why this possibility is ruled out. First,
being linked the pronoun is, strictly speaking, still a pronominal in the
syntactic sense and not a true variable, and one can regard (34) äs still a
case of vacuous quantification.12 Second, even if this indirect relation
between the pronoun and the operator counts for meeting the principle of
non-vacuous quantification, there is reason to believe that in fact the linking
itself cannot be established - because the formal variable (the w/z-word)
is not "accessible" to it. The literature on the phenomenon of Weak
Crossover contains much research on the conditions under which a pronoun
can take a variable äs its antecedent. Chomsky's (1976) "Leftness
Condition" (so dubbed in Higginbotham 1 980a) accounts for the basic cases.
Others have proposed different formulations (cf. Koopman and Sportiche
(1982), Safir (1985), among others). It seems, however, that empirically
the most adequate characterization is contained in the Accessibility
Condition of Higginbotham (1980b). Higginbotham 's point is that a pronoun
can take a variable äs its antecedent only if the variable is accessible to
it, where accessibility is defined äs in (35) (see Higginbotham (1980b)
for a detailed discussion of different cases):
(35) A is accessible to B iff
a. A is an empty category strongly accessible to B or
b. A is an empty category whose Container γΒ (Α) is accessible
to B; or
c. A is not an empty category, and for some C, A is coindexed with
C and C is accessible to B.
where strong accessibility is defined äs follows:
A is strongly accessible to B iff
(i) A is an empty category that c-commands B; or
12
 Note that vacuous quantification is a syntactic notion. See (33) for the Prohibition Against
Vacuous Quantification.
TWO TYPES OF DONKEY SENTENCES 137
(ii) A is not an empty category, and for some C, A is co-
indexed with C and C is strongly accessible to B.
Note that the Accessibility Condition, which was proposed to rule in
variable binding in cases involving "inversely linked" quantification but
disallow Weak Crossover, also correctly'rules out bare conditionals with
an anaphoric pronoun in the consequent clause. The wh-v/οτά in the
antecedent clause (the A element in Higginbotham's definition) is not acces-
sible to the pronoun in the consequent clause, first because it does not
c-command the pronoun, and secondly because none of its Containers (e.g.,
the antecedent clause) is accessible. The antecedent clause is not acces-
sible because it is not itself an empty category and not coindexed with
any empty category. Hence a pronoun in a bare conditional cannot function
äs a variable to satisfy the requirement of non-vacuous quantification.
(Similarly, a bare conditional with a pronoun in the antecedent and a wh-
word in the consequent is ruled out because the pronoun cannot satisfy
the requirement of restrictive quantification.)
As for treating the pronoun in bare conditionals äs an Ε-type pronoun,
it is clear from the above discussion on the necessity operator that this
will lead to vacuous quantification - since the pronoun is not a variable.13
In fact, an Ε-type pronoun is also independently ruled out when it falls
within the scope of its related operator. For example, in a sentence like
Ά farmer who owns a lot of donkeys thinks he is rieh' the pronoun he
has only a bound-variable reading, but cannot be paraphrased äs 'the farmer
who owns a lot of donkeys'.14
Now consider the case where an empty category is used in place of a wh-
word in the consequent clause. If the empty category is an empty
pronominal, it will lead to the sanie problems that we have just mentioned.
On the other hand, if the empty category is a variable (granted that a variable
can be base-generated), we treat it on a par with the parasitic gap examples
in (36). Consider the contrast shown between (36) and (37) (examples
from Safir 1985):
13
 A reviewer points out that if, äs we will discuss m section 3.2.1., it is possible for the
necessity operator to bind a Situation variable, this may obviate the problem of vacuous
quantification However, if the operator binds a Situation variable in the consequent clause,
it must also do so in the antecedent clause (see (33)). Hence, the possible binding of the
Situation variable does not help regarding vacuous quantification. That is, if the necessity
operator binds a situation-ννΛ pair (i e. binds two elements at the same time), then it must
bind such a pair in the consequent clause äs well
14
 This fact presumably follows from Binding Condition C under the Ε-type analysis, since
defmite descnptions are R-expressions m the sense of the Binding Theory.
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(36) a. who, [did you [fire e,] [without informing e,]]
b. who, does [[John like e,] and [Mary hate e,]]
(37) a.? who, [did you [fire e,] [without informing him,]]
b.*who, does [[John like him,] and [Mary hate e,]]
Safir (1985) proposes the constraint stated in (38) to account for the contrast.
(38) The Parallelism Constraint on Operator Binding (PCOB)
If O is an operator and χ is a variable bound by O, then for
any y, y a variable of Ο, χ and y are [a lexical].15
The cases in which an empty variable is in the consequent clause of a
bare conditional can also be accounted for by the PCOB. That is, the
necessity operator cannot bind a w/z-word ([+lexical]) and an empty variable
([-lexical]) at the same time because the PCOB is violated.16
Recall that the w/z-word in the consequent clause must be identical to
the w/z-word in the antecedent clause. This may follow from a strong real-
ization of the PCOB. The [a lexical] requirement ensures that the variables
must be either all lexical or all empty. Another way of implementing this
is to say that the variables must be all identical. If one is empty and the
other is lexical, the requirement is not satisfied. If this is the case, then
we can ensure that the w/z-word in the consequent clause must be iden-
tical to the one in the antecedent clause. Note that we also need to accom-
modate cases in which more than one w/z-word appears in the antecedent
clause. The variables that an unselective/polyadic quantifier binds are not
necessarily identical, äs we have seen earlier. However, if we separate the
variables in the restriction and the nuclear scope, then we can impose the
PCOB on these cases äs well. That is, each variable in the restriction must
be identical to a corresponding variable in the nuclear scope. This goal
15
 The term "lexical" here corresponds to "phonetic reahzation." Thus, ivA-words are
[+lexical] because they are phonetically reahzed, whereas empty categones are [-lexical]
due to the lack of phonetic reahzation.
16
 The PCOB itself is not sufficient to account for the subject-adjunct asymmetry indi-
cated below (also see the margmal Status of (37)).
(i) *Who, did the pictures of him, please t,?
(n) 9 Which book, did you buy t, without readmg it,'
We assume that (11) is acceptable because (under an appropnate revision of the Accessibihty
Condition) the real gap (the trace) is weakly accessible to a pronoun m an adjunct (but not
to a pronoun in a subject) That is, (n) is not necessarily treated äs a case of multiple
variable binding by the operator, and therefore not subject to the PCOB. Both the PCOB
and the Accessibihty Condition are necessary constructs, and neither can replace the other.
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can be achieved by the following generalization, which is a revised version
of the PCOB:
(39) Revised PCOB
In a tripartite structure of quantification Q [A] [B], [X,, X2,
. . . , Xn] (where n > 1) are variables in A. For every variable
in A, there must be an identical variable in B.
Lastly, we have also seen that definite descriptions cannot be used in
place of the w/z-word in the consequent clause. If definite descriptions are
directly bound by the necessity operator, they are variables. However, though
definite descriptions may be used äs variables, they cannot be used äs
such to satisfy (39) since they are not identical to the w/z-variables in the
antecedent clause.17 On the other hand, if the definite descriptions in the
consequent clause are not directly bound by the necessity operator, we again
have the problem of vacuous quantification (i.e. violation of (33)).
We have now seen that the properties of bare conditionals can be
naturally explained once these constructions are taken äs cases of unselective
binding in action. Even on an intuitive level, these properties are quite
natural properties of the construction. The two variables required by restric-
tive, non-vacuous quantification are both directly, locally bound by their
operator. Hence they are of equal Status äs true formal variables, neither
dependent on the other. Since there is no direct anaphoric relationship
between them, anaphoric expressions like pronouns and definite descrip-
tions are inappropriate.
3.2. Oou/Rugao-Conditionals
Recall that dou/ruguo-conditionals present an opposite Situation from the
one we see in bare conditionals. There cannot be a w/z-word in the conse-
quent clause. Instead, a pronoun, an empty category, or a definite description
is used. Furthermore, the consequent clause need not contain any anaphoric
element at all. In the analysis presented above, we appeal to an implicit
operator for the universal force that the w/z-words have. We will argue in
this section that the w/z-word in the antecedent clause in doulruguo-
conditionals is not bound by an operator external to the antecedent clause.
17
 Note that it is possible to have a definite description in the antecedent clause and an
identical one in the consequent clause, äs shown in (i) below:
(i) ni xihuang nei-ge ren, wo jiu da nei-ge ren
you like that-CL person I then hit that-CL person
'If you like that person, Γ11 then hit him/her.'
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Instead, it is treated äs an existential quantifier that has scope internal to
the antecedent clause. Thus, there is no requirement which forces the
presence of a w/z-word in the second clause. Further, the pronoun in the
consequent clause is treated äs an Ε-type pronoun.
3.2.1. Rugao-Conditionals
The first question we must address in rwgMo-conditionals is related to the
quantificational force of the w/z-word äs well äs its licenser. We have
stated that in bare conditionals, the w/z-words are licensed and bound by
the necessity operator and have universal force. /?wg«o-conditionals differ
from bare conditionals in that there is a leading element ruguo 'if' in the
antecedent clause. We suggest that this leading element is the licenser of
the w/z-word(s) in the antecedent clause. Just äs in the case of polarity
any, the leading element 'if' licenses a w/z-word in its scope äs a (gener-
alized) existential quantifier. Once licensed, the w/z-word is treated äs an
existential quantifier in the traditional sense, subject to Quantifier Raising,
which adjoins it to the antecedent clause IP. The QR-ed existential quan-
tifier is then analyzed in terms of a restrictive quantification Schema, with
its determiner (overt or covert) mapped onto an operator position, and its
N' mapped onto a restrictive clause. The operator binds a variable in the
restrictive clause mapped from N', and another variable - the trace left
by QR - in the nuclear scope, in this case the antecedent clause. Thus, a
rMgwo-conditional such äs (40a) has an LF representation like (40b), which
is mapped to the semantic representation in (40c):18
(40) a. ruguo ni kan-jian le shei, jiu jiao ta lai
if you see ASP who then teil him/her come
jian wo
see me
b. ruguo [sheij [ni kan-jian le tj, [jiu jiao ta lai jian wo]
c. If (for some x, (x a person) (you see x)), then teil him/her to
come see me.
Note that the representation (40c) satisfies the prohibition against vacuous
18
 As an alternative, rather than treating the wft-word äs a quantifier, we might still treat
it äs a variable "caught" by existential closure (Heim 1982, Diesing 1992) in the absence
of a binder ('if being merely a licenser). The existential closure has scope internal to the
//-clause. If we follow Heim and Diesing and assume that in such cases no restrictive clause
is needed, the relevant facts are also accounted for. We shall not pursue this Option, so äs
to preserve a unified assumption of a tripartite structure for quantificational sentences.
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quantification (33). The relevant tripartite structure is already 'complete'
within the antecedent clause. There is then no need for an additional wh-
word in the consequent clause. Instead, an anaphoric element like a pronoun
or definite description can, but need not, appear in that clause. That the
vWz-word(s) in a ragwo-conditional have existential force is evidenced by
the following fact.
In Mandarin Chinese, indefinite subject NPs can be preceded by the
existential verb/marker you 'have, there is', äs shown in (41a-b), while
definite subject NPs cannot, äs in (41c).19 The sentences in (42) and (43)
show a clear contrast between bare conditionals and ragwo-conditionals. The
former does not allow you 'have' to precede a w/z-subject while the latter
does, indicating that the w/z-word in rwgwo-conditionals has existential
force.20
(41) a. (you) yi-ge-ren lai le
have one-CL-person come ASP
One person came.'
b. (you) shei lai le
have who come ASP
'Who came?'
c.*you nei-ge-ren lai le
have that-CL-person come ASP
'That person came.'
(42) *you shei xian lai, shei xian chi
have who first come who first eat
'If X comes first, X eats first.'
19
 In some cases, such äs the sentence in (i), the presence of you 'have' is obligatory.
(i) *(you) ren lai-le
have person come-ASP
'Someone came.'
20
 Note that you 'have' only functions äs an indefinite marker/indicator when it precedes
the subject. In presentational sentences or sentences involving possession, you 'have' does
not mark an indefinite NP (see for instance (i) below). See Huang 1987 for a discussion of
indefiniteness/definiteness effects in Chinese.
(i) jintian you shenme, chi shenme
today have what eat what
'Whatever (we) have today, (we) eat today.'
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(43) ruguo you shei qiao men, ni jiu jiao ta
if have who knock door you then ask him/her
jin-lai
come in
'If someone knocks on the door, you'11 ask him/her to come
in.'
We have seen that, given our analysis of the w/z-word äs an existential quan-
tifier that takes scope over the antecedent clause, a complete tripartite
structure can be obtained within the antecedent clause. This explains why
there is no need for a second w/z-word in the consequent clause. In fact,
this also helps to explain why a w/z-word cannot appear in the consequent
clause at all. Since the w/z-word in the antecedent clause is already licensed
äs an existential quantifier in the antecedent clause, if there is another w/z-
word in the consequent clause, that w/z-word would need to have a licenser
and a binder also. The only likely licenser and binder in such a case is
the necessity operator. However, the presence of the necessity operator
will lead to the problems we have just noted in section 3.1. That is, the
tripartite structure formed in such a case will not have a variable in the
restriction.21
The necessity operator, however, can be present. It does not bind the
w/z-word(s) in the antecedent clause since they are already bound and
licensed. Instead, the necessity operator can ränge over cases or situations
(see Berman 1987 and Heim 1990). Thus, a sentence such äs (23b), repeated
below, has the Interpretation in (44).
(23b) ruguo ni kandao shei, qing jiao ta lai jian
if you see who please teil him/her come see
wo
nie
'If you see someone, please ask him/her to come see me.'
(44) For every Situation (s), if you see someone in (s), please ask
him/her to come see me in (s).
21
 Note that we have stated that ruguo 'if hcenses the wA-word(s) in the antecedent clause
äs an existential quantifier. This does not entail that ruguo is the element that provides
existential force to the w/j-phrase One way of looking at this is to adopt Diesmg's proposal
of indefinites m English. That is, νν/ί-words m Mandarin are similar to indefinites in Enghsh
in that they have both variable Status and true existential quantifier Status. The difference
we see in Chinese is that the ννΛ-words must have a licenser The variable Status of wh-
words allows them to be bound by the necessity operator, while the true existential quantifier
Status allows them to have existential force m rwgwo-conditionals
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Since the necessity operator binds a Situation variable, it does not require
another wh-v/ord to be present in the consequent clause (i.e. the prohibi-
tion against vacuous quantification is satisfied).
One may ask why the necessity operator does not ränge over situations
in bare conditionals. We think that in fact it does (see also footnote 13).
Recall that the necessity operator is an unselective/polyadic quantifier. It
can bind many variables at the same time. Thus, in a bare conditional
such äs (12), the necessity operator can also ränge over situations. The
reading will be roughly äs in (45).
(12) shei xian lai, shei xian chi
who first come, who first eat
'If X comes first, X eats first.'
(45) For all (x, s(ituation)) (if χ comes first in s), (x eats first in s).
In other words, the necessity operator in (12) binds a pair of variables,
one of which is a Situation variable.
3.2.1.1. Ε-type Pronouns. We have explained why donkey anaphora in
rwgwo-conditionals cannot take the form of a w/z-word. From the same
analysis it clearly also follows that the consequent clause need not contain
any anaphoric element at all. However, our analysis allows anaphoric
elements such äs a pronoun, an empty category, or a definite description
in the consequent clause. We propose that the pronoun in the consequent
clause which refers to the w/z-word is an Ε-type pronoun. In other words,
a rwgwo-conditional such äs (23b) (repeated below) will have the Inter-
pretation indicated in (46).
(23b) ruguo ni kandao shei, qing jiao ta lai jian
if you see who please teil him/her come see
wo
me
'If you see someone, please ask him/her to come see me.'
(46) If you see someone, please ask the one you see to come see
me.
As mentioned earlier, Evans (1980) shows that an Ε-type pronoun cannot
refer to NPs such äs no girls, no one, no sheep etc., in contrast to a true
bound pronoun (examples from (4) are repeated below äs (47)).
(47) a. No congressmen admire only the people they know.
b.*No congressmen admire Kennedy, and they are very junior.
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Examples of rwgwo-conditionals show that the antecedent clause cannot
have an expression equivalent to no one äs the antecedent of the pronoun
ta.
(48) *ruguo meiyou shei ma ni, ni jiu jiao ta
if not-have who scold you, you then ask him/her
lai jian wo.
come see me
*'If no one scolds you, then you ask him/her to come see nie.'
This fact is consistent with the supposition that the pronoun in a ruguo-
conditional is an Ε-type pronoun.22
In ruguo- äs well äs ifow-conditionals, the pronoun can be replaced by
an empty element or a definite description. The fact that it can be a definite
description is not a surprise since that is exactly what the Interpretation
of an Ε-type pronoun is. As for empty elements, the pronoun can be replaced
by an empty pronoun, though not äs a variable. An empty pronoun will
be just an empty version of an Ε-type pronoun. The empty element cannot
be a variable, since a variable needs to be bound. Even though the neces-
sity operator can bind it, the binding will not create the right tripartite
structure since there is no comparable variable in the restriction.
Note again that given our analysis, the unselective/polyadic binding cases
are the ones in which the w/z-words are independently bound by the neces-
sity operator. Each w/z-word has an independent Status äs a variable, and
none is anaphoric to another. In contrast, in the ruguo cases the elements
in the consequent clause are dependent on the w/z-words in the antecedent
clause. Hence such elements must be anaphoric in form.
3.2.2. Oou-Conditionals
Dow-conditionals are similar to ri/gwo-conditionals in that the consequent
clause may contain a pronoun, an empty element, or a definite descrip-
tion, but cannot contain another w/z-word. However, the Interpretation of
JoM-conditionals differs from that of rwgwo-conditionals. In particular,
JoM-conditionals resemble the "unconditionals" that Zaefferer (1990) dis-
cusses. Zaefferer states that unconditionals strengthen a claim by stating
"that it holds independent of the choice from some alternatively conceiv-
22
 The ungrammaticality of (48) may also be related to the hcensing and binding of the
wft-word shei m the expression meiyou shei, which is equivalent to 'no one'.
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able circumstances." We will discuss the formal properties of Jow-condi-
tionals further below.
In ί/oM-conditionals, the pronoun also cannot have a negative quantifi-
cational expression äs an antecedent, which is consistent with an E-type
pronoun analysis:
(49) *meiyou shei qiao men, ni dou jiao ta jinlai
no-have who knock door you all ask him/her enter
* 'If no one knocks on the door, you will then ask him/her to come
in.'
Given the data we have seen, the w/z-word in the antecedent clause of a dou-
conditional appears to be a quantifier. Is it a universal or an existential
quantifier? The sentence below suggests that shei in the antecedent clause
is existential, given the fact that the pronoun that follows it can take the
Singular form, paraphrasable äs 'the person you ask to come in':
(22b) ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian ta
you ask who come in I all see him/her
'Whoever you ask to come in, I will see him/her (the person who
you ask to come in).'
The truth condition of (22b) is roughly (50):
(50) For all χ, χ (a person you ask to come in), I will see x.
As mentioned earlier, an Ε-type pronoun taking a universal quantifier äs
its antecedent must be plural in form. We shall then treat ifow-conditionals
on a par with rwgHo-conditionals äs involving existential quantification
internal to the antecedent clause, from which it follows that these two
constructions share the same clustering of properties under consideration,
in contrast to bare conditionals.
There is an important question, however, that Stands in the way of treating
ί/oM-conditionals in terms of existential quantification. As the truth condi-
tion of (50) is intended to show, the sentence has the force of universal
quantification. It is true just in case on every assignment of the value of
χ such that you ask χ to come in, I will see x; and it is false otherwise.
To ascertain the correctness of our assumption, we must first consider the
role of dou more closely and resolve what now appears to be a contradic-
tion.
3.2.2.1. The Role of Dou 'All'. The idea that the ί/ow-conditionals involve
existential quantification is somewhat surprising given the well-known
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fact that dou triggers universal quantification over the denotation of an
expression to its left:23
(51) a. dajia dou hen xihuan ta.
everyone all very like him/her
'Everybody likes him/her.'
b. ta shenme dou chi.
s/he what all eat
'S/he eats everything.'
Dow-conditionals have apparent differences from rwgwo-conditionals. The
former do not have a leading element in the antecedent clause while the
latter do not have the quantifier dou 'all' in the consequent clause. While
it is commonplace knowledge that a polarity item in the scope of if has
the Status of an existential quantifier, it has also been commonly assumed
in the literature that a w/z-word to the left of dou (äs in (51b)) is used äs
a universal quantifier.
We shall now argue that this latter assumption is incorrect, at least for
the cases of dow-conditionals under consideration. More specifically, we
claim that the antecedent clause of a Jow-conditional is an elliptical phrase
containing an embedded question. As an embedded question, the 'antecedent
clause' is then interpreted äs having the force of existential quantifica-
tion, given the Standard semantics of questions. The donkey pronoun or
definite description refers to the w/z-word qua existential quantifier. The
similarities between ruguo- and ί/οκ-conditionals then follow straight-
forwardly. As for the adverb dou, which triggers universal quantification,
we argue that it quantifies over the set of propositions that is the denota-
tion of the question (see Hamblin 1973; cf. Harttunen 1977, Engdahl 1986,
Lahiri 1991, among others). There is then no contradiction in saying that
ifow-conditionals involve both existential and universal quantification.
23
 There are some apparent exceptions to this long-held observation, represented by examples
hke (i).
(i) m dou mai-le shenme9
you all buy-ASP what
'What did you buy">'
Such exceptions occur only with ννΛ-questions, and only with those with the presupposition
that the tvA-word ranges over a non-singleton set. We beheve that such cases can be
naturally accounted for by the assumption that quantification is over minimal events, or sit-
uations, that are 'slices' of a larger event/situation mvolvmg multiple objects. For more
discussion on this issue see Cheng 1995 and Li 1994; for more general discussion on the
syntax of dou see Cheng 1991, 1995, and references cited there.
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As support for the proposal that ifow-conditionals involve elliptical
embedded questions, note that the antecedent clause can in fact be fully
spelled out with the question embedded under the subordinating conjunc-
tion bulun 'regardless of, which we assume s-selects an interrogative
proposition äs its complement. (We shall assume that bulun 'regardless
of has a categorial Status on a par with ruguo 'if, a P or a C, which s-
selects a non-interrogative.)
(52) bulun ni jiao shei jin-lai, wo dou jian ta
regardless you ask who come-in I all see him/her
'Regardless of who you ask to come in, I will likewise see
him/her.'
Further support for the interrogative Status of the antecedent clause comes
from the fact the clause may contain the w/z-elements that have only an
interrogative use. For example, we have seen that a w/z-word like shei 'who'
or shenme 'what' can have the use of a non-interrogative phrase, either
äs a variable with universal force under unselective binding or äs an
existential quantifier in polarity contexts. However, interrogative forms like
weishenme 'why' or the Ά-not-A' construction are excluded from such uses.
Neither can be used in bare conditionals or rwgwo-conditionals:
(53) a.*ta lai-bu-lai, wo jiu lai-bu-lai
he/she come-not-come I then come-not-come
b.*ta weishenme bu lai, wo jiu weishenme bu qu
he/she why not come I then why not go
(54) a.* ruguo ta lai-bu-lai, wo jiu rang ta gen
if he/she come-not-come I then let him with
ni shuo hua.
you say word
b.*ruguo ta weishenme lai, wo jiu rang ta
if he/she why come I then let him/her
gen ni shuo hua.
with you say word
(53a) cannot be accepted äs making the assertion that I will follow him
whichever choice he makes between 'come' and 'not come', i.e., I will come
if he comes, and I will not come if he does not. Similarly, (53b) is not
acceptable äs making the assertion that whatever his reason will be for
not coming, it will be the reason for my not going. In (54), the condi-
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tional clause is unacceptable with the intended meaning "if he makes one
choice or another between 'come' and 'not come'," or "if he comes with
(at least) one reason" (then, I will let him speak with you).24
In contrast with these sentences, corresponding doH-conditionals are
perfectly well-formed:
(55) a. ta jintian lai-bu-lai, wo dou bu deng ta.
he/she today come-not-come I all not wait him/her
'Whether he/she comes or not today, I won't wait for him/her.'
b. ta weishenme mei lai, wo dou bu hui
he/she why not come I all not will
yuanliang ta.
forgive him/her
'Regardless of why he didn't show up, I won't forgive him/her.'
The well-formedness of (55) shows that the antecedent clause of a dou-
conditional is an embedded question. It should be noted, then, that what
we have called a Jow-conditional is really not a conditional in the typical
sense (though we shall continue to call it a conditional). This is further
evidenced by the fact that the 'antecedent clause' cannot take ruguo, and
the 'consequent clause' cannot take jiu 'then' (in addition to dou), unlike
the bare and rwgwö-conditionals:
(56) a.* ruguo ni kanjian-le shei, wo dou jian ta.
if you see who I all see him/her
b.*ni kanjian-le shei, wo jiu dou jian ta.
you see who I then all see him/her
A natural question that arises at this point is why the antecedent clause
must be a question. The answer is that this is forced by the presence of
dou 'all', which requires something to its left to be universally quantifi-
able, hence something that can be construed äs denoting a plural set of
entities such äs a question. The semantics of 'regardless of allows the
set of propositions (or circumstances) that satisfy the embedded question
to be universally quantified, but a pure conditional clause, which cannot
occur in construction with 'regardless of, does not. Hence a non-inter-
24
 Incidentally, note a similar gap m English regarding the affixation of -ever and some-:
*whyever, *whetherever, "somewhy, *somewhether. For some discussion of the internal
structure of wA-words in Chinese and English, see Cheng 1991 and Tsai 1994.
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rogative sense of the w/z-word in the antecedent clause is not possible. In
addition, äs mentioned earlier, i/ow-conditionals appear to resemble a certain
type of conditionals called "unconditionals" by Zaefferer (1990). Zaefferer
notes that "unconditionals seem to be encoded in most languages by inter-
rogative clauses, more precisely by alternative and constituent inter-
rogatives" (p. 489). The reason why languages tend to use interrogatives
in unconditionals, according to Zaefferer, is that interrogatives "define
sets of issues . . . äs representing exhaustively the ränge of options that
are currently taken into considerations," and that it is the exhaustiveness
that lead to the unconditional interpretations.
Recapitulating, then, in a ifow-conditional there is universal quantifica-
tion ranging over the set of propositions that define the embedded question
in the antecedent clause. At the same time, since interrogative w/z-words
have the Status of an existential quantifier having scope internal to the
embedded question, an interrogative phrase in such a construction will
undergo w/z-movement into the Spec of the embedded clause and have scope
over it (äs in the tradition of Huang 1982). Thus the consequent clause
may contain an overt or covert Ε-type pronoun or a definite description
(or it may contain no such element at all), but it crucially cannot contain
another w/z-word. This ränge of properties falls out in the same way äs those
observed with rwgwo-conditionals.
3.3. Apparent Alternations
In section 2 we saw data from Yu (1965) which indicate possible alterna-
tions between a w/z-word and a pronoun in bare conditionals. The examples
are repeated below äs (57):
(57) a. shei yao zhe puo-chang, wo jiu rang gei
who want this broken-factory I then give to
talshei
him(her)/who
'Whoever wants this broken factory, Γ11 give it to him/her.'
b. shei bu dui, wo jiu shuo talshei bu dui
who not right I then say he(she)/who not right
'Whoever is not right, Γ11 say that he/she is not right.'
In these two examples, donkey anaphora can be expressed with either a
w/z-word or a pronoun. As they stand, these examples are problematic to
the analysis presented above. In contrast to these data, we have found that
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there is otherwise a general complementary relationship between w/i-words
and pronouns in the consequent clause.
We will argue here that the apparent alternation is due to the possi-
bility of omitting ruguo 'if' in rwgwo-conditionals. First, we have observed
above that these unexpected alternations are found only where the second
clause contains the elementjz'w 'then'. With a "completely bare" conditional
(with neither ruguo nor jiu), no alternation is allowed ((21) is repeated
below):
(21) she yao zhe puo-chang, wo rang gei
who want this broken-factory I give to
shei/*ta.
who/him(her)
'Whoever wants this broken factory, I will give it to him/her.'
This shows that in a typical bare conditional, alternations are not allowed,
äs our analysis predicted. Note, however, that äs we have seen in section
2.1, it is possible to havej'zM 'then' in a bare conditional and, thus, examples
such äs (57) can also be bare conditionals. Consider now typical ruguo-
conditionals such äs (58).
(58) a. ruguo hufei lai, wo jiu liu-xia-lai
if Hufei come I then stay
'If Hufei comes, then I will stay.'
b. hufei lai, wo jiu liu-xia-lai
Hufei comes, I then stay
'If Hufei comes, then I will stay.'
In (58b), we see that the leading element ruguo 'if' in a ragwo-conditional
can be optional. We will call such a conditional a "reduced" ragwo-condi-
tional. There is no meaning difference between (58a) and (58b). Crucially,
(58b) is interpreted äs a conditional. Hence, based on (58b) and the
possibility of having jiu 'if' in a bare conditional, sentences such äs (58)
can be ambiguous between a "reduced" rtigwo-conditional and a bare
conditional. In other words, in these examples, when the donkey pronoun
is in a w/z-form, we are dealing with a bare conditional, and when it is an
anaphoric pronoun, we are dealing with a "reduced" rugwo-conditional.
Furthermore, in examples such äs (57), when an anaphoric pronoun is
used, it has to be in the singular form, äs in (59), showing that we are dealing
with a w/z-word with existential force in the antecedent clause.
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(59) a. shei yao zhe puo-chang, wo jiu rang gei
who want this broken-factory I then give to
tat* tarnen
him(her)/them
'Whoever wants this broken factory, Γ11 give it to him/her.'
b. shei bu dui, wo jiu shuo tal*tamen bu dui
who not right I then say he(she)/them not right
'Whoever is not right, Γ11 say that he/she is not right.'
(59a,b) further confirm our analysis that (57) is a "reduced" ruguo-condi-
tional; the w/z-word does not have universal force. In short, there is in
fact no "alternation." The examples in (57) are simply realizations of an
ambiguity between bare conditionals with jiu 'then' and "reduced" ruguo-
conditionals.
3.4. Mixed Cases
The data we have presented so far involve sentences that use either the
unselective binding strategy or the Ε-type pronoun strategy. As sentences
(60)-(61) show, a mixed strategy may also be used:
(60) shei yan shei ta jiu de xiang shei
who play who s/he then must resemble who
'If X plays the role of Y, then s/he must resemble Y.'
(61) shei xiang chi shenme, ta jiu chi shenme
who want eat what s/he then eat what
'If X wants to eat Y, s/he then eats Y.'
In both (60) and (61), the subject of the consequent clause is an overt
pronoun. However, the objects in the antecedent clause and the conse-
quent clause are w/z-words. We consider these to be mixed cases, which
use both the unselective binding strategy (object) and the Ε-type strategy
(subject). The latter strategy is possible because the sentences may be
analyzed äs rwgwo-conditionals with jiu 'then'. As noted earlier, whenj/w
'then' is absent, the conditionals are 'completely bare'. In these mixed
cases, jiu 'then' cannot be absent:
(62) *shei yan shei ta de xiang shei
who play who s/he must resemble who
'If X plays the role of Y, s/he must resemble Y.'
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(63) *shei xiang chi shenme, ta chi shenme
who want eat what s/he eat what
'If X wants to eat Y, s/he eats Y.'
In these grammatical mixed cases, the non-overt ruguo 'if can pick one
or more NPs to license. In the examples we have seen, ruguo 'if' only picks
one NP (the subject) to license and thus the subject in the antecedent
clause is existential.
The Option of licensing only the subject äs existential leaves the object
w/z-word unlicensed. In this case the necessity operator comes in äs an
unselective binder and licenser, giving it universal force. Thus, the object
w/z-words in these mixed cases have universal force. As shown in these
examples, the related NP used in the consequent clause can be an anaphoric
pronoun if it corresponds to an existential w/z-word. In contrast, since the
object w/z-word in the antecedent clause is licensed and bound by the
necessity operator, the related NP in the consequent clause can only be in
the form of a w/z-word.25
We have proposed that in these mixed cases, there is a non-overt ruguo
'if'. It should be noted that if ruguo is overt, mixed cases are not allowed,
äs shown in (64).
(64) * ruguo shei yan shei ta de xiang shei
if who play who s/he must resemble who
'If X plays the role of Y, s/he must resemble Y.'
Thus, it appears that the presence of overt ruguo 'if' blocks the licensing
and binding of the w/z-words from the necessity operator. Given a sentence
such äs (64), even though ruguo can license the subject and the object
w/z-words in the antecedent clause, the object w/z-word in the consequent
clause cannot be licensed.
25
 Jo-wang Lin (pers. comm.) points out that (i) is not äs good äs the other mixed cases
shown here.
(i) *shei yan shei, shei jiu de xiang ta
who play who who then must resemble s/he
'If X plays the role Y, then X must resemble him/her.'
(i) shows that there is a subject-object asymmetry in mixed cases. The sentence differs from
the other grammatical mixed cases in that the NP that is being licensed by the non-overt ruguo
'if is the object rather than the subject. We tentatively surmise that this is a locality/
minimality effect on licensing. If licensing is done from top to bottom and cannot skip,
then we would not expect the object to be licensed but not the subject.
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4. V AND Ξ R E A D I N G S
As Chierchia (1992) and others point out, the indefinite NP in donkey
sentences may have what he calls 'V and/or 3 readings'. For instance, in
(65), the indefinite a dime only has a Ξ reading. In contrast, (66) seems
to have the V reading only.
(65) Every (most, etc.) person who has a dime will put it in the meter.
(Pelletier and Schubert 1989)
(66) Every man who owned a slave owned his/her offspring.
In (65), a V reading would mean that every man will put every dime he
has into the meter. But this reading is in fact the least likely reading we
get. An unselective binding analysis which treats (65) äs universal quan-
tification over person-dime pairs fails to exclude this reading. On the
other hand, the classic donkey sentence can have either the V or the 3
reading, depending on the context (see Chierchia 1992 for details).
In the two types of donkey sentences discussed in this paper, we can
see a contrast in terms of V and 3 readings. In particular, the bare condi-
tionals only have the V reading, while the rwgwo-conditionals can have either
the 3 reading or the V reading. Further, in Jow-conditionals, due to the
presence of dou 'all', we have a Situation in which the wh-word is exis-
tentially quantified but the sentence also exhibits a V reading.
4.1. Bare Conditionals
In our analysis of bare conditionals, the w/z-words are each locally bound
by a necessity operator which provides universal force. According to this
analysis, all the w/z-words in a bare conditional are interpreted univer-
sally. Consider now the sentence in (67):
(67) ni xihuan shei, wo jiu xihuan shei
you like who I then like who
'If you like X, I will then like X.'
The truth condition of (67) is roughly:
(68) For all χ, χ a person you like, I will like X.
The truth condition of (67) requires that I like all the people that you like.
In particular, the sentence is false if you like four people but I only like
three of them.
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4.2. Oou/Ruguo-Conditionals
We have shown earlier that the w/z-words in ruguo and cfow-conditionals
have existential rather than universal force. However, we have also shown
that in dou-conditions, dou 'all' contributes universal quantification over
the embedded question in the antecedent clause. The contrast between (69)
and (70) shows that rwgwo-conditionals differ from dow-conditionals in
that the latter yield a V reading.
(69) ni you shenme pengyou, wo dou hui ba ta
you have what friend I all will BA him/her
jieshao gei Lisi
introduce to Lisi
'If you have a friend, I will always introduce him/her to Lisi.'
(70) ruguo ni you shenme pengyou, jiu jieshao
if you have what friend then introduce
ta gei Lisi
him/her to Lisi
'If you have a friend, you should introduce him/her to Lisi.'
The truth condition of (69) is given in (71):
(71) Vp ((3X (x a friend) [p = Λ you have x]) -> I will introduce
him/her (the friend that you have) to Lisi in the event of p)
In this representation, the elliptical embedded question ' [regardless of ] what
friend you have' is interpreted by an existential quantification over friends
representing a set of propositions that constitute the denotation of the
question. Then the presence of dou and the semantics of the implicit
'regardless of' trigger universal quantification over members of this set. The
truth condition of (71) entails 'V
x
 ((x a friend that you have) —> (I will
introduce x to Lisi))'. The logical representation of (71) correctly captures
the fact that (69) will be false if only some of your friends are introduced
to Lisi.
In contrast, the truth condition of (70) does not require that all friends
of yours be introduced to Lisi. As long äs one of them is introduced, the
sentence will be true. The logical representation of (70) is (72).
(72) For some χ, χ a friend of yours, I will introduce x to Lisi.
Note that it is also possible to have a V reading in this case. In such a
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case, every friend of yours must be introduced to Lisi. The choice between
the V reading and the 3 reading appears to depend on context.
In Jow-conditionals, the V reading is required even though the wh-
words are existentially quantified. And in ragwo-conditionals, even though
we can have the Ξ reading, it is also possible to get the V reading. Obviously,
the V reading is not contributed by the quantificational force that the wh-
words have, but by other factors. In the case of dou-conditionals, we have
shown that it is contributed by dou 'all' (and the semantics of an implicit
'regardless of). In the case of rwgwo-conditionals, we suggest that the V
reading comes from the possible presence of the necessity operator ranging
over minimal situations. If every (minimal) Situation is considered, then
in every Situation in which a friend of yours is involved, that friend of yours
will be introduced to Lisi. This is the V reading. Since the V reading is
contributed by an implicit operator, we predict quantificational variability
in the presence of other overt adverbs of quantification. This prediction is
borne out. Thus to a sentence like (73) one may add an adverb such äs
tongchang 'usually', youshi 'sometimes', or henshao 'seldom', and the
sentence may be interpreted äs if it had the quantificational force of a
most-, some-, or few-N', respectively (the reader can verify this point for
himself/herself):
(73) ruguo wo you shenme shi, hui tongzhi ni.
if I have what thing will inform you
'If I have something (in my mind), I will let you know.'
This shows, incidentally, that quantificational variability under adverbs
of quantification does not, by itself, entail unselective binding of an indef-
inite. The variability can be observed equally well when the adverbs simply
quantify over situations (see also footnote 2). In Chierchia (1992), it
suggested that the V reading comes from the Ε-type pronoun strategy. We
have seen that the unselective/polyadic binding strategy also has the V
reading. In fact, it is this type of strategy which has consistent V readings.
In contrast, in the Ε-type pronoun strategy cases, both V readings and 3
readings are possible. Hence, it appears that the Ε-type pronoun strategy
does not entail V readings only and V readings are not particular to the
Ε-type pronoun strategy.
5. THE PROPORTION PROBLEM
Another controversial area in donkey anaphora has to do with the 'pro-
portion problem' and the distribution of Symmetrie and asymmetric readings.
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The problem has to do with whether an adverb of quantification is anchored
to one or all of the indefinites in a given sentence:
(74) If a farmer owns a donkey, he is usually rieh.
Consider a scenario with 100 farmers, 99 of whom each own one donkey
and are poor and the lOOth of whom owns 200 donkeys and is rieh.
Following the terminology of Kadmon, the Symmetrie reading is the one
according to which the adverb is anchored to both a farmer and a donkey,
i.e., to minimal situations where exactly one farmer owns exactly one
donkey. Thus according to this reading, the· sentence is purported to assert
that in most cases involving a minimal farmer-donkey pair, the farmer is
rieh. For the scenario under consideration, the sentence is purported to be
true because it asserts that of the 299 farmer-donkey pairs, most (200) pairs
involve a rieh farmer. The subject-asymmetric reading is the one in which
the adverb is anchored to a farmer, to situations that are minimal with
respect to the farmers (exactly one farmer who owns one or more donkeys).
In the current scenario the sentence is purported to be false because it asserts
that of the 100 farmer-donkey pairs, more man half involve a poor farmer.
In an object-asymmetric reading, the adverb would be anchored to situa-
tions that are minimal with respect to the donkeys only (exactly one donkey
which is owned by one or more farmers). The fact is that for a sentence
like (74), the subject-asymmetric reading is (almost) the only reading
available (äs Speakers have no problem judging the sentence to be false
under the current scenario). The problem is whether this fact can be pre-
dicted by a proper theory of indefinites, such äs unselective binding or
the Ε-type strategy.
We agree with Heim (1990) and Chierchia (1992) in believing that the
Proportion problem does not directly rest on the choice between unselec-
tive binding and the Ε-type analysis. As Chierchia (1992) shows, all three
readings considered above may in principle be available for a sentence
like (74), the relative salience of a particular reading being determined by
pragmatic factors such äs topic choice. (In the default cases, the subject-
asymmetric reading is salient, presumably because subjects are more
topical.) We show briefly here that both types of donkey sentences in
Chinese can have Symmetrie äs well äs asymmetric readings. This confirms
the view that the proportion problem does not distinguish between the two
strategies of analyzing donkey sentences, and that both of them are needed
in natural language. We do not commit ourselves äs to how to account
for the asymmetric readings; for it is likely that this question is not to be
answered within the core domain of grammar (see Heim 1990 and Chierchia
1992 for detailed discussions).
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Consider the following examples:
(75) Bare Conditional
shei yan shei, shei tongchang jiu xiang shei
who play who who usually then resemble who
'If X plays the role of Y, then usually X will resemble Y.'
(76) Dow-Conditional
shei yan shei, ta tongchang dou hui xiang
who play who s/he usually all will resemble
nei-ge-jiaose
that-CL-role
'If χ plays the role of Y, then X usually will be similar to the
role of Y.'
(77) Ruguo-Condiuonal
ruguo shei yan shei, ta tongchang jiu hui
if who play who s/he usually then will
xiang nei-ge-jiaose
resemble that-CL-role
'If X plays the role of Y, then X usually will be similar to the
role of Y.'
In all of these cases, if there is a topic specified, the sentence becomes
asymmetric with respect to the topic. Take (75) for instance. If the Speaker
first says "with respect to the characters (roles) in this play," then the reading
will be asymmetric with respect to the roles. Thus, the example shows
that topic choice is relevant, äs Chierchia (1992) points out. To illustrate
more explicitly, consider the case where a topic is specified and there are
10 actors, with 9 of them each playing one role while the tenth actor
plays 10 roles. If all nine actors play their single role well while the tenth
actor does not play any of his roles well, then the sentence will come out
false. In contrast, if the topic is the actors, then such a scenario will yield
a true sentence. The same holds of dou- and rwgwo-conditionals äs well.
It is in fact also possible to get a Symmetrie reading, if an explicit topic
is indicated, say with respect to minimal actor-role pairs. (A scenario that
would distinguish the Symmetrie reading from both asymmetric readings
would be one in which some actors may play more than one role, and
some roles may each be played by more than one actor.) Though it may
be easier to obtain the subject-asymmetric reading in all these cases, we
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assume that this is due to the fact that subjects tend to be taken äs the
implicit topic in the absence of an overt topic. In the latter two cases
((76)-(77)), this may also be due to the presence of an anaphoric pronoun
in the consequent clause.
6. COMPARING WITH CORRELATIVES
Although we have analyzed the bare conditionals in Chinese äs cases of
unselective binding, it has occurred to us that these constructions bear
considerable resemblance to the correlative construction in Hindi and other
related languages.26 To readers familiär with this construction it may have
been tempting to assimilate the analysis of bare conditionals to what best
accounts for correlatives. We argue here that, in spite of superficial simi-
larities, bare conditionals are not correlatives. We show that they differ in
several important respects, which strongly argue for treating them in dif-
ferent ways.
6.1. Structural Difference
First of all, note that bare conditionals do not bear any remote structural
resemblance to typical relative clauses in Chinese. As is well known, a
relative clause in Chinese must be attached to the modification marker
de, äs shown in (78). Furthermore, the relative clause precedes its head.
(78) Wo mai-le Jinyong xie *(de) shu
I buy-ASP Jinyong write DE book
Ί bought books that Jinyong wrote.'
Chinese also does not have internally headed relatives of the kind found
in Navajo, Quechua, Japanese (Platero 1978, Cole 1987, Ito 1986), etc.
Finally, although Chinese has the equivalent of a free relative like the
ones in what you see is what you get, the syntactic equivalent of this
would differ from a headed relative only with respect to the presence of
an overt head:
(79) [ni kanjian de [e]] jiushi [ni hui dedao de [e]]
you see DE i s you will get DE
'What you see is what you will get.'
We thank Ken Haie for pointing this out to us.
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Of course, the meaning of the sentence can also be expressed with a bare
conditional, but it takes on a different form:
(80) ni kanjian shenme, ni jiu hui dedao shenme.
you see what you then will get what
'If you see X, then you will get X.'
In bare conditionals, the relativized marker de is never present. Further,
there is no head NP around. In addition, the consequent clause of a bare
conditional may contain the adverb jiu 'then', which is typically used in
true conditional sentences. Hence, structurally, bare conditionals are not
relative clauses.
6.2. TenselAspect
Bare conditionals in Mandarin Chinese are very restricted with respect to
tense/aspectual specifications. In particular, the verb in the consequent clause
cannot bear a completive aspect (äs in (81b)). If it bears any element that
indicates tense/aspect, it is the future hui 'will' (in 81 a)). In contrast, cor-
relatives in Hindi have no such restrictions, äs shown in (82).
(81) a. shei lai, shei jiu hui zong jiang
who come who then will win prize
'Whoever comes, s/he will win a prize.'
b.*shei lai, shei jiu zong-le jiang
who come who then win-ASP prize
(82) jis laRkiiNEj ji laRkeKOj dekhaa usNE; usKOj
REL girl-ERG REL boy-ACC Saw DEM-ERG DEM-ACC
passand kiyaa
liked
'Which girl saw which boy, she liked him.'
Srivastav (1991)
This contrast follows naturally if bare conditionals in Chinese are genuine
conditionals and correlatives in Hindi are genuine relatives. A conditional
sentence expresses an if-then relationship between two clauses, and it is
typical for the consequent clause to express a Situation posterior, rather than
anterior, to the Situation expressed by the antecedent clause. Such a relation
is clearly not required in the case of typical relative clauses, äs is evident
from the sentence The boy who loves you now used to hate you for a lang
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time. Note that this difference also corresponds with the fact that only the
bare conditional may take the adverb jiu 'then' in the consequent, but the
correlative cannot. Posteriority is a characteristic property of the consequent
clause of a conditional sentence, but not a property of a relativized con-
struction.
6.3. Symmetrie vs. Asymmetrie Readings
It has been pointed out by Kadmon (1990) and Heim (1990), among others,
that relative clauses and iflwhen clauses differ in that relative clauses always
show asymmetric quantification with respect to the head NP, whereas
iflwhen clauses are more flexible in terms of which head is asymmetri-
cally quantified and can also show Symmetrie quantification. Thus for the
sentence in (83) below, it is impossible to get anything but the subject-
asymmetric reading:
(83) Most farmers who own a donkey are rieh.
As noted earlier, bare conditionals can have Symmetrie or asymmetric
readings depending on topic selection in discourse. Hence they are similar
to iflwhen clauses. In contrast, in Hindi correlatives, only asymmetric
readings can be obtained. Since correlatives in such cases have two rela-
tivized head NPs, the asymmetric reading can be with respect to either of
them. Crucially, no Symmetrie reading is available, äs the following (from
Uptal Lahiri, pers. comm.) shows:
(84) jo aadmii; jis gadhe-kOj rakhtaa hai vo aadmiij
REL man REL donkey-ACC keeps DEM man
zyaadatar us gadhe-kOj piiTtaa hai
mostly DEM donkey-ACC beats
'Which man keeps which donkey, he mostly beats it.'
There is abundant evidence, then, that bare conditionals are genuine con-
ditionals, and not instances of a "Chinese Version" of the correlative
construction.
7. CONCLUSION
In this study we have seen that there are two paradigms of donkey sentences
in Chinese, which exhibit systematic syntactic differences with respect to
the distribution of w/z-words and anaphoric NPs. We showed that these
otherwise puzzling properties find a natural explanation in general, inde-
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pendently motivated principles once they are treated in terms of unselec-
tive binding and an Ε-type analysis, respectively. In line with Heim (1990)
we believe that considerations of uniqueness and of the proportion problem
do not argue for the adoption of unselective binding in addition to the
more traditional Ε-type analysis. But given the systematic differences
observed between the two sentence types in Chinese, there is reason to
resurrect the unselective binding mechanism äs part of Universal Grammar
- though, somewhat ironically, not for the kind of sentences in English
that led to Heim's proposal of the mechanism in the first place. We showed
that this 'mixed' approach accounts for further differences between the
two paradigms with respect to V and 3 readings. Finally, we showed that
bare conditionals and correlative constructions, though they share certain
superficial similarities, must be distinguished and treated äs two different
species.
An obvious corollary of our paper is that indefinites that are lexically
unspecified with respect to their quantificational force can be either vari-
ables or true quantifiers, depending on the availability of each use in a
context or language, but not on observed quantificational variability alone.
Once each use is determined, however, other properties of donkey sentences
will follow, äs required by independent principles of grammar. Another
corollary is that all w/z-words are not equal in Chinese (contrary to what
Aoun and Li (1993) and others assume). Some are unselectively bound,
but others are moved (under QR or LF w/z-movement). In fact, even exactly
the same w/z-word may or may not be moved at LF, depending on whether
it occurs in the environment of a bare, a ruguo- or a i/ow-conditional.27
This conclusion is needed if we assume that quantification is restrictive
and non-vacuous, and that it involves a tripartite structure consistently. In
the ruguo- and ί/οκ-conditionals in particular, a tripartite structure is created
by moving a quantifier nuclear scope and mapping its N' onto a restric-
tion (cf, Diesing 1992). The relevant movement may be QR, and possibly
w/z-movement äs well, especially in cases of ί/ow-conditionals involving
'why' or Ά-not-A' that do not have a non-interrogative Interpretation.
27
 The determining factor is clearly not whether a given wÄ-word is D-linked or non-D-
linked in the sense of Pesetsky (1987).
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